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Abstract
Space traffic management has often, for example in the IAA Cosmic Study of 2006, been rather
broadly defined as “the set of technical and regulatory provisions for promoting safe access into
outer space, operations in outer space and return from space to Earth free of physical or radio-frequency
interference.” Oftentimes, especially in space law literature, references or even comparisons have
been made to traffic management as it has developed in aviation and (to a lesser extent) in maritime
transport.
However, it should be realized that space traffic management, especially under the definition
quoted, comprises a considerably larger range of activities than air traffic management. If space traffic management is ever to become feasible, therefore, rather than just referring to air and/or maritime
traffic management, first a high-level overview should be performed of what space traffic management effectively will comprise, what has already been taken care of and to what extent, and where
perhaps guidance from the aviation realm may be useful after all.
The present paper will provide such a first high-level inventory, duly taking into account the
various special features of space activities which may provide major obstacles for any truly comprehensive space traffic management regime, much more so than in the airspaces of this world.

1. Introduction
Space traffic management has often, for example in the IAA Cosmic Study of 2006, been
rather broadly defined as “the set of technical and regulatory provisions for promoting
safe access into outer space, operations in outer space and return from space to Earth free
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of physical or radio-frequency interference.”1 Oftentimes, moreover, especially in space
law literature, references or even comparisons have been made to traffic management as it
has developed in aviation and (to a lesser extent) in maritime transport.
However, if space traffic management is ever to become feasible, such comparisons
should be scrutinized with great care. “Space traffic management” would not only encompass the orderly management of (1) “piloted vessels,” which is what air traffic management is at the heart all about, but in addition would have to deal with (2) “vessels” which
are piloted remotely (read “unmanned spacecraft”), some of which moreover intend to
operate in earth orbits for many years whereas others by contrast are supposed to move
beyond earth orbit altogether, (3) “vessels”—and their component and fragmented parts—
which are no longer “piloted” in any meaningful sense (read both “small unguided satellites” and “space debris”), and, following the Cosmic Study definition, as an even more
different “item,” (4) the use of radio frequencies. Moreover, several specific aspects of
space activities, such as the military and dual-use ones, the physical operational environment and the needs for communication, as well as the speed of movement pose additional
problems for any truly comprehensive space traffic management regime, much more so
than in the airspaces of this world.
Thus, the present paper represents a first high-level framework analysis of the major
structural aspects of that challenge—on the assumption that it would still need to be addressed in the not too distant future.
2. The point of departure: “traffic management” in air law
The term “traffic management,” in particular in an international context, has mainly become an issue of importance in aviation and, to a considerably lesser extent (due to the
velocity of the vessels concerned being a dimension or two smaller), in maritime
transport.
In international aviation, “air traffic management” (ATM) has evolved out of the more
concise and limited notion of “air traffic control” (ATC). Whereas the latter was very much
focused on specific (legal as well as resulting factual) control of aircraft movements to
avoid collisions and near-collisions of aircraft for safety reasons (as well as subsidiary, security purposes of controlling entry into sovereign airspace),2 the former came to incorporate also broader aspects such as efficient and environmentally friendly use of airspace.3
In all cases, however, the baseline category of targeted vehicles was fairly straightforward and, at a certain level of abstraction, uniform in nature: “aircraft,” meaning “any
machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air other than
the reactions of the air against the earth’s surface”4 capable of considerable maneuvering
even at short notice since being piloted by humans on board. Compared to the four categories which the Cosmic Study asserts should be addressed by space traffic management,
this represents the aviation version of only the first category, that of piloted vessels.
In addition, from a legal perspective, the authorities responsible for ATM were clearly
demarcated by “geographical,” “spatially” defined borderlines. Every state was sovereign
in its own national airspace, which was clearly bounded by the borders of its territory and
territorial waters,5 and could within such sovereign airspace guarantee the implementation
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of a coherent and comprehensive ATM system. That the vertical boundary of airspace sovereignty was not in any way formally determined constituted no problem, at least from
the perspective of air law: nobody would dispute that all aircraft addressed by ATM systems were flying in airspace as opposed to any other kind of “space,” read: outer space.
As for the airspace above international waters, under the auspices of the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) specific states were “appointed” to provide for such
an ATM system on behalf of the international community and such a role was formally
accepted by all other ICAO member states.6 While “geographically” speaking such international airspaces covered the greater part of the globe, in terms of actual aircraft operations they were much less relevant than the totality of sometimes heavily used national
airspaces. International air law, including on ATM as developed under ICAO auspices,
was thus allowed to develop almost organically from the handling of most aviation needs
at a national level.
In sum, for respective national airspaces each time one single national authority was
made responsible for the management of all relevant traffic and given the competences
and instruments to do so, whereas for the international airspaces one single intergovernmental organization operating under a single international conventional regime ensured
proper arrangements of such responsibilities, competences and instruments.
Though formally military aircraft did not fall under the rules of the Chicago Convention,7 individual states would of course in their national ATM systems take care of any
potential interference of military aircraft with civil aviation wherever this could—occasionally—be at issue, for example by the creation of special “no-fly zones” reserved for air
force maneuvers.
These ATM systems also generically allowed for special flights of aircraft not engaged
in civil aviation as principally addressed by the Chicago Convention and ICAO, whether
this concerned commercial aviation (the small business jets), amateur aviation, aviation
sporting events, hot air balloons or even rocket launches (where the launch area would
become a temporary no-fly zone for the duration of the launch window). This simply
worked, principally because there was little question—or at least an underlying assumption—that ATM could focus on civil aviation and handle other uses of the same threedimensional spaces as exceptions to the standard approaches and procedures.
The core of the system finally consisted of two main elements: (1) awareness with a
central entity of the positions and intended trajectories of all aircraft and occasional other
craft—all, however, so far comprising “piloted vessels”—in a certain three-dimensional
airspace, and (2) the competence of such an entity, following a priori rules, regulations,
procedures, and standards, to direct specific aircraft to change position or trajectory in such
a manner as to avoid threats to safety or security or allow for efficient use of airspace.
While undoubtedly the example of ATM would thus be very interesting and useful in a
number of respects when it comes to creating a space traffic management system, when
transferring this comprehensive but straightforward and relatively monolithic system-ofsystems to outer space the above evaluation has to be borne in mind. At least three major
issues would consequently arise here.
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3. The awareness issue: the reality of spaceflight
First, the maneuverable manned vessels which formed the core of the global ATM system
comprise, certainly so far, a minority of all vessels moving in outer space. A system mainly
based on communicating with pilots would consequently fall woefully short of a comprehensive and safe system of “awareness.” Self-reporting by automated devices would need
to be comprehensively effectuated to establish that.
In addition, for unmanned spacecraft any traffic management system should substitute
such communication for awareness purposes with pilots and automated onboard systems
with communication to the ground control systems. That should not be an insurmountable
problem, yet it has to be taken into account—for instance, because a particular space object
may be monitored by various ground stations spread across the globe depending upon the
particular location at issue at any given point in time.
For unguided small satellites and space debris, however, mostly even that approach of
taking on board ground stations would not work—both would normally not have any automated self-reporting capability on board (anymore). Whereas for the unguided small
satellites—hopefully—proper registration with the Registration Convention8 combined
with the usually short duration of their presence in a limited area at the lower margins of
outer space would be sufficient to create positional awareness of maneuverable spacecraft
as part of a space traffic management system, it does indeed require an across-the-board
application of the registration obligations. Currently, however, the picture in this regard is
not very comforting; many small satellites as of yet go unregistered because of confusion
on the applicability of the Registration Convention to “a space object [not] launched into
Earth orbit beyond.”9
As for space debris, however, it has already become abundantly clear that no amount
of fully-fledged application of the Registration Convention would be able to take care of
the extent to which a space traffic management would require relevant position and trajectory information.10 While there are some “unilateral” efforts to provide the international
community with data on identified space debris, such as the US Space Surveillance Network (SSN), also these are currently far removed from the level of comprehensiveness necessary for a viable and effective space traffic management system.11
Finally, the use of radio frequencies for communication purposes has of course also been
present in aviation almost since its inception, and through the ITU system does allow for
at least a general level of “awareness.”
A summary investigation of current law and key players in the realm of awareness thus
shows the complexity of (and the loopholes within) the existing landscape. An ITU-regime
takes care of assignment of frequencies used by satellites as well as the attendant orbital
slots or orbits at the international level, with some national regimes implementing that
regime for national operators—but also for exclusively national usage of frequencies and
orbital slots/orbits. Frequencies used by space vehicles, whether sub-orbital or orbital, and
space stations such as the ISS, also somehow fit within that system.
The Outer Space Treaty at the same time “rules” the general behavior of states with
respect to satellites and other space objects, notably including the notification and consultation obligations under Article IX. Further to Articles VIII and IX of the Outer Space
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Treaty, the Registration Convention provides for its own—though rather summary—system of “awareness,” read registration of main parameters, including national registration
as appropriate. As said, there is furthermore considerable doubt regarding its application
to sub-orbital launches, whether manned or unmanned.
As for “space debris,” that system is rather unsatisfactory, and awareness exclusively
relies on a few national, unilateral surveillance systems, as indicated.
4. The competence issue: the “faits accomplish” of space (law)
Second, in outer space there is no system for allocating ATM-like authority along the lines
of the Chicago Convention, individual sovereign states and the ICAO system. Unlike air
space, outer space of course as a whole falls outside of individual states’ sovereign jurisdiction12 and thus basically equates with the (airspace above the) high seas in terms of its
international legal status. And whereas the Chicago Convention has provided the baseline
formula for handling ATM above the high seas under ICAO guidance further to individual
states operating domestic ATM systems in national airspace, there is no comparable provision in the Outer Space Treaty or comparable authority resting with COPUOS to assume
the central coordinating role of ICAO in its framework—including in the context of ITUrelated frequency management.13
Yet, simply providing ICAO with an extension of its authority to address aircraft so as
to encompass also spacecraft not only would require considerable expertise with space
flight (generally available much more in specialized space agencies than at ICAO) and profound adaptation of the system of the Chicago Convention (such as overhauling the current definition of “aircraft” quoted above), but also would ignore a few fundamental
aspects of current space activities and space law which would make the exercise of such
authority by ICAO a rather different paradigm as compared to its longstanding role in
international aviation.
To start with, the ICAO system of “competence” hinges on communication with pilots
to initiate flight maneuvers following the directions of an ATM authority—but piloted vessels only comprise one category out of four needed to be regulated by a space traffic management system.
For the other categories, it would be required to establish a system addressing the remote control mechanisms instead. For the second category this might still work, although
one needs to be aware again that a number of ground stations may come into play, as
opposed to the piloted vessels which operate under the single authority of the aircraft commander.
Then again, the third category could still not be properly addressed, as this consists of
space objects which are, by definition, nonguidable. This category, in other words, is essentially beyond any “compliance.”
As for the fourth category: it was never envisaged as an element to be regulated by
traffic management, as the Cosmic Study would have it, but instead as an element to allow
traffic management to become possible in the first place! The role of ICAO and its member
states in ensuring that such radio frequency use was duly protected in the context of the
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ITU thus also was a key element of air traffic management itself, where no comparable
international construct exists for space traffic management.
Furthermore, as indicated, contrary to ATM technology which is widely available across
the world, only a handful of states currently possess the actual possibility—read technology—to generate and properly use the information needed to order spacecraft around for
safety purposes as part of a space traffic management system. In view of the major military
and dual-use aspects of space activities, those few states would already have a fundamental problem with freely sharing such information—whereas on the other end, space activities by definition having a global impact, all other states may not feel comfortable with
becoming lopsidedly dependent on such information—let alone with directive management of their space activities and spacecraft.14
Furthermore, in terms of the law, ICAO would not step into a vacuum. COPUOS has by
way of the space treaties and more recently for example the COPUOS Guidelines on Space
Debris Mitigation provided for a legal framework for space activities that, although far
from sufficient to provide for or even deal with space traffic management, does provide
for some important legal framework rules and principles.15 Even more pertinently, as indicated, with regard to the last major element to be incorporated into any viable space
traffic management system, the use of radio frequencies has since a number of years been
(by and large satisfactorily so) arranged through the mechanisms available with the ITU—
which as a matter of fact also addressed the orbital slots respectively orbits the spacecraft
using those frequencies were to occupy.16 No future space traffic management could feasibly be envisaged without recognition, likely even proper integration, of these existing legal
regimes.
Also in the realm of competence a summary investigation of current law and key players thus shows the complexity of (and the loopholes within) the existing landscape.
The ITU does not so much “possess a competence” to determine relevant elements of
space traffic management in the context of frequencies and orbital positions, but rather
represents a “gentlemen’s system of exchange of information and coordination of behavior
for the common good”—largely dependent furthermore on national implementation by
those with real authority to direct operators to move a space object. Would that be really
sufficient for an all-encompassing space traffic management system, in an environment
where more and more commercial interests interfere with the more traditional military
and political interests?
To begin with, this addresses essentially at best only two out of the four Cosmic Study
categories in any comprehensive manner: radio frequencies and unpiloted vessels—the
latter actually only to the extent completing orbits around the earth (including for this purpose the geostationary orbit).
Whereas space traffic management competence in the context of space debris boils
down to the right to move it out of harm’s way, this essentially accrues not to any international organization, platform or system-of-systems but to the state accountable for it in the
first place, witness also the discussion on space debris remediation as potentially requiring
states to allow their defunct space objects to be taken out of harm’s way by other states
willing to do so, along the lines of the concepts of “abandonment” and “ship wrecks” in
the law of the sea.17
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Finally as to piloted vessels, while they also use radio frequencies, the ITU has no authority whatsoever to determine where these vessels should fly, or even what messages
the radio frequencies to be used are to transmit in that regard. That remains exclusively
the competence of the states operating (or, in the future with private manned spaceflight,
controlling) such vehicles.
Even in the United States, however, the state furthest advanced in (addressing) manned
spaceflight management, the discussion on how to exercise US jurisdiction in space inter
alia for traffic management purposes is only just gearing up.18
Here, it should be noted moreover that developments seem to go against any more or
less straightforward extension of air law at least for the purposes of traffic management to
outer space. Noting of course that we have not seen any actual such flights yet, the United
States has chosen not to address key issues for traffic management purposes such as permission to operate and use a certain trajectory as a special kind of aviation, but as a (space)
launch activity.
Thus, it was the 1984/1988 Commercial Space Launch Act which was amended in 2004
to address seemingly impending private commercial sub-orbital flights.19 In the launch license due attention is given to the permitted launch trajectory, if only for the purposes of
calculating the Maximum Probable Loss (MPL) which forms the basis of any third-party
liability of the operator and the insurance he is obliged to take out to cover such liability.20
US air law and ATM regulations would only come into the picture to the extent of the
habitual temporary clearance of US airspace around the launch site. The most recent step
here is effectively just a first step: a requirement imposed by Congress upon NASA in conjunction with other relevant US government bodies “to study alternate frameworks for the
management of space traffic and orbital activities.”21
While in Europe for some time an effort (meanwhile aborted or at least put on hold) was
made to address the future operations of at least those sub-orbital vehicles that fitted the
definition of “aircraft,”22 this focused on the certification of such craft as per EASA,23 not
on ATC and ATM as per Eurocontrol.24
5. The issues of “delimitation” and “innocent passage”
Third, whereas for air law purposes the need to determine where, vertically speaking, (sovereign) airspace gives way to outer space did not really exist, for purposes of a future space
traffic management system it seems that this would have to change. This directly relates to
the question of “innocent passage” through foreign airspace on the way to or back from
outer space, as this has often been posited analogously to the law of the sea.25 Is a spacecraft
flying at altitudes of 60, 80, 100 respectively 120 km over the territory of a state different
from where it took off already in outer space, meaning that the underlying state cannot
claim any sovereign territorial control over that spacecraft, including subjecting it to its
national (air) traffic management system? Or would such spacecraft still be considered as
crossing a foreign state’s sovereign airspace, in which case the latter’s jurisdiction allows
it to condition such flight on compliance with certain traffic management regulations or
even completely prohibit it—unless the aforementioned “innocent passage” applies, in
which case the underlying state presumably would still be allowed to impose traffic

7

VON DER

DUNK, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SPACE LAW 2015

management–related obligations, as long as not thereby effectively denying passage as
such.26
As sufficiently discussed elsewhere,27 the best that could be said is that as of today a
convergence could be noted on agreement to take the 100-km altitude line as presenting
the legal boundary between airspace and outer space, which would be ready to morph into
customary international law if it would not be for the official resistance of the United
States, the leading spacefaring nation of today certainly when it comes to private manned
spaceflight, to accepting such a boundary line—or indeed, any legal boundary.
6. Toward a solution?
In any event, in contrast to aviation, the vast majority of space operations to be subjected
to a future space traffic management system takes place in a global commons as opposed
to sovereign territories. This fact alone makes the role of some kind of intergovernmental
organization on space traffic management more crucial and indispensable still than ICAO
for international aviation, which after all was established after several decades of international commercial aviation had already passed by.
Much more than in aviation, the management of traffic in outer space for the purpose
of safe flights of manned and unmanned vehicles alike, would require a near-comprehensive
space situational awareness system taking into consideration not only the many objects
unmanned and difficult to maneuver but also the many objects impossible to maneuver—
yet capable of causing devastating damage to other spacecraft by impact. After all, as compared to aviation, the speed of movement has become a dimension or two larger still, making it even less likely for visual or other last-minute course corrections to remain the
ultimate solution for avoiding accidents or serious threats thereof. Also the communication
with those space objects that are capable thereof would largely differ from the classical
modes of communication with aircraft, in view of most of the aforementioned ones being
unmanned.
Perhaps the most helpful approach is to start by recognizing that at the end of the day
an intergovernmental authority, whether existing or newly to be established, should approach the issue of space traffic management along the lines of ATM over the high seas:
get all states to agree within the bounds of an international regime for specific states to
provide the services necessary in a particular part of outer space for everyone concerned
to operate safely and efficiently—and without violating existing international law or otherwise threatening the international peaceful status quo regarding outer space.
Where this would, likely, for the foreseeable future not be a politically feasible option,
a start could be made on the level of awareness—as is currently, to some extent, done by
way of various space situational awareness initiatives. From such an “awareness system”
a “competence system” should evolve along gradual lines, not necessarily immediately
giving rise to a comprehensive globally accepted legally binding construct.
In a first step, this could give rise to an optional adherence to such a system by a few
leading—and farsighted—states willing to take a bow to an international regime, perhaps
even entity, for the sake of an ultimately better and safer space environment.
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In a second phase, such an adherence could then gradually translate into a major factor
mitigating liabilities in particular in the context of fault liability for damage caused by one
space object to another. Ultimately, thus the ground could be prepared for the third and
final step: a properly binding system of space traffic management with an effective international dispute settlement mechanism.
Depending on whether there would be such a massive increase in spaceflight (manned
or unmanned) as to urgently require an international, comprehensive, and coherent space
traffic management system, we might perhaps still have the time to overcome the political
and other impediments in the way of the above suggested role of an intergovernmental
entity, first in the realm of awareness, then in that of competence, first under an optional
approach, then in legally binding fashion across the globe (read universe). Best, therefore,
to start the discussion in earnest now—after all, it is even by comparison to aviation truly
a challenge of cosmic proportions to develop a coherent, comprehensive, efficient, and acceptable system of space traffic management in the sense of the Cosmic Study’s definition.
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